A unified duality-based approach to Bayesian mechanism design

Computer Science/Discrete Mathematics Seminar II
Topic:A unified duality-based approach to Bayesian mechanism design
Speaker:Matt Weinberg
Affiliation:Princeton University
Date:Tuesday, February 14
Time/Room:10:30am - 12:30pm/West Building Lecture Hall
Video Link:https://video.ias.edu/csdm/2017/0214-MattWeinberg

We provide a duality framework for Bayesian Mechanism Design. Specifically, we show that the dual problem to revenue maximization is a search over virtual transformations. This approach yields a unified view of several recent breakthroughs in algorithmic mechanism design, and enables some new breakthroughs as well. In this talk, I'll: 1) Provide a brief overview of the challenges of multi-dimensional mechanism design. 2) Construct a duality framework to resolve these problems. 3) Apply the framework to derive the 6-approximation of Babaioff et al. for a single additive bidder.  4) State some newer results achieved through this framework.